Strengthen built-in default policy

README.md

@@ -9,12 +9,17 @@ It classifies operations into four outcomes:
 - **deny** — block outright
 - **refine** — block and tell the model how to reformulate the command safely
 
-The default policy is opinionated but usable:
+The default policy is opinionated but usable, and it is now **baked into the code** even if you provide no config file.
+
+Built-in defaults:
 
 - `sudo` and `ssh` are **not denied by default**
 - risky commands are generally **confirmed**
 - only objectively dangerous or ambiguous forms are **denied/refined**
 - destructive deletes should use an **explicit absolute path**
+- `curl` / `wget` / `nc` / `socat` / `telnet` are **confirmed**
+- `env` / `printenv` are **confirmed**
+- bash-based writes to sensitive files such as `AGENTS.md`, `.env`, shell dotfiles, SSH config, and local policy files are **confirmed**
 
 ## What it protects against
 
@@ -27,9 +32,12 @@ Examples of behavior it catches by default:
 - `find . -delete`
 - `sudo ...` (confirmation)
 - `ssh ...` / `scp` / `rsync` / `sftp` (confirmation)
+- `curl ...`, `wget ...`, `nc ...`, `socat ...` (confirmation)
+- `env`, `printenv` (confirmation)
 - `git reset --hard`, `git clean -fdx`, `git push` (confirmation)
+- `sed -i ~/.bashrc ...` or `tee AGENTS.md` (confirmation)
 - writes outside the workspace (confirmation)
-- reads/writes to sensitive paths such as `~/.ssh` or `.env` (confirmation)
+- reads/writes to sensitive paths such as `~/.ssh`, `AGENTS.md`, or `.env` (confirmation)
 
 ## Install
 
@@ -38,7 +46,7 @@ Examples of behavior it catches by default:
 Private Gitea/GitHub style install:
 
 ```bash
-pi install git:git@git.enne2.net:enne2/pi-policy-gate.git
+pi install 'ssh://git@git.enne2.net:222/enne2/pi-policy-gate.git'
 ```
 
 Or with HTTPS:
@@ -50,7 +58,7 @@ pi install https://git.enne2.net/enne2/pi-policy-gate.git
 ### With npm from the git repository
 
 ```bash
-npm install git+ssh://git@git.enne2.net/enne2/pi-policy-gate.git
+npm install git+ssh://git@git.enne2.net:222/enne2/pi-policy-gate.git
 ```
 
 Then load it from local `node_modules` or publish it to your npm registry later.

index.ts

@@ -61,17 +61,63 @@ const DEFAULT_SENSITIVE_PATH_GLOBS = [
 	"~/.config/gcloud/**",
 	"~/.azure/**",
 	"~/.gnupg/**",
+	"~/.docker/**",
+	"~/.kube/**",
+	"~/.config/gh/**",
 	"~/.pi/**",
+	"**/.pi/**",
 	"**/.env",
 	"**/.env.*",
 	"**/*.pem",
 	"**/*.key",
 	"**/.netrc",
 	"**/.git-credentials",
+	"~/.gitconfig",
+	"~/.wgetrc",
+	"~/.curlrc",
+	"~/.npmrc",
+	"~/.pypirc",
 	"~/.bashrc",
 	"~/.zshrc",
 	"~/.profile",
 	"~/.bash_profile",
+	"~/.local/bin/**",
+	"~/.config/systemd/**",
+	"**/.git/config",
+	"**/.git/hooks/**",
+	"**/AGENTS.md",
+	"**/CLAUDE.md",
+	"**/.cursorrules",
+	"**/copilot-instructions.md",
+];
+
+const SHELL_WRAPPERS = new Set(["bash", "sh", "zsh", "fish"]);
+const REMOTE_COMMANDS = new Set(["ssh", "scp", "sftp", "rsync", "mosh"]);
+const NETWORK_COMMANDS = new Set(["curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "socat", "telnet"]);
+const PACKAGE_MANAGER_COMMANDS = new Set(["dnf", "yum", "apt", "apt-get", "zypper", "pacman"]);
+const PLATFORM_CONTROL_COMMANDS = new Set(["docker", "podman", "kubectl", "helm", "mount", "umount", "dd", "crontab", "at"]);
+const PATH_AWARE_WRITE_COMMANDS = new Set(["cp", "mv", "install", "ln", "touch", "mkdir", "tee", "truncate"]);
+const PATH_AWARE_READ_COMMANDS = new Set(["cat", "less", "more", "head", "tail", "file", "stat"]);
+const SENSITIVE_BASENAMES = new Set([
+	"AGENTS.md",
+	"CLAUDE.md",
+	".cursorrules",
+	"copilot-instructions.md",
+	".env",
+	".netrc",
+	".git-credentials",
+	".bashrc",
+	".zshrc",
+	".profile",
+	".bash_profile",
+	"config",
+]);
+const DEFAULT_POLICY_FEATURES = [
+	"confirm sudo, ssh/scp/rsync/sftp, service changes, package-manager mutations, network clients, and destructive git",
+	"deny only objectively unsafe forms such as wildcard recursive deletes or safety-wrapper bypass attempts",
+	"refine recursive deletes and find -delete into explicit absolute paths",
+	"confirm reads/writes against sensitive files and writes outside the workspace",
+	"confirm bash-based file mutations targeting sensitive paths such as AGENTS.md, .env, shell dotfiles, SSH keys, and local policy files",
 ];
 
 const DEFAULT_CONFIG: ResolvedConfig = {
@@ -168,6 +214,111 @@ function firstNonOption(tokens: string[], start = 0): number {
 	return -1;
 }
 
+function uniqueStrings(values: string[]): string[] {
+	return Array.from(new Set(values.filter(Boolean)));
+}
+
+function extractShellCodeArg(args: string[]): string | null {
+	const flagIndex = args.findIndex((token) => token === "-c");
+	if (flagIndex >= 0 && args[flagIndex + 1]) {
+		return args[flagIndex + 1];
+	}
+	return null;
+}
+
+function isLikelyUrl(token: string): boolean {
+	return /^[a-z][a-z0-9+.-]*:\/\//i.test(token);
+}
+
+function looksLikePathToken(token: string): boolean {
+	if (!token || token === "-" || isLikelyUrl(token)) return false;
+	return (
+		token.startsWith("/") ||
+		token.startsWith("./") ||
+		token.startsWith("../") ||
+		token.startsWith("~/") ||
+		token === "." ||
+		token === ".." ||
+		token.includes("/") ||
+		SENSITIVE_BASENAMES.has(token)
+	);
+}
+
+function extractRedirectionTargets(command: string): string[] {
+	const targets: string[] = [];
+	const regex = /(?:^|\s)(?:\d*>>?|<<?)\s*([^\s|&;]+)/g;
+	for (const match of command.matchAll(regex)) {
+		const target = stripOuterQuotes(match[1] ?? "");
+		if (looksLikePathToken(target)) targets.push(target);
+	}
+	return uniqueStrings(targets);
+}
+
+function extractCandidatePathTokens(commandName: string, args: string[], rawCommand: string): string[] {
+	const candidates = args.filter((token) => !token.startsWith("-") && looksLikePathToken(token));
+	if (commandName === "tee") {
+		return uniqueStrings([...candidates, ...extractRedirectionTargets(rawCommand)]);
+	}
+	return uniqueStrings([...candidates, ...extractRedirectionTargets(rawCommand)]);
+}
+
+function extractPathAssessment(tool: ToolName, rawPath: string, cwd: string, config: ResolvedConfig) {
+	const absPath = canonicalizePath(isAbsolute(expandHome(rawPath)) ? expandHome(rawPath) : resolve(cwd, rawPath));
+	const inWorkspace = config.workspaceRoots.some((root) => isWithinRoot(absPath, root));
+	const sensitive = isSensitivePath(absPath, cwd, config);
+	const details = [
+		`Resolved path: ${summarizePath(absPath, cwd)}`,
+		`Workspace roots: ${summarizeRoots(config, cwd).join(", ")}`,
+	];
+	return { absPath, inWorkspace, sensitive, details };
+}
+
+function classifyPathAccessFromBash(
+	mode: "read" | "write",
+	commandName: string,
+	pathTokens: string[],
+	cwd: string,
+	config: ResolvedConfig,
+): Decision | null {
+	if (pathTokens.length === 0) return null;
+	const assessments = pathTokens.map((token) => ({ token, ...extractPathAssessment(mode, token, cwd, config) }));
+
+	if (mode === "read") {
+		const sensitive = assessments.filter((item) => item.sensitive);
+		if (sensitive.length > 0 && config.confirmSensitiveReads) {
+			return makeDecision(
+				"confirm",
+				`Confirm ${commandName} sensitive read`,
+				`${commandName} reads a sensitive path.`,
+				sensitive.flatMap((item) => [`Argument: ${item.token}`, ...item.details]),
+			);
+		}
+		return null;
+	}
+
+	const sensitiveWrites = assessments.filter((item) => item.sensitive);
+	if (sensitiveWrites.length > 0 && config.confirmSensitiveWrites) {
+		return makeDecision(
+			"confirm",
+			`Confirm ${commandName} sensitive write`,
+			`${commandName} may modify a sensitive path.`,
+			sensitiveWrites.flatMap((item) => [`Argument: ${item.token}`, ...item.details]),
+		);
+	}
+
+	const outsideWorkspace = assessments.filter((item) => !item.inWorkspace);
+	if (outsideWorkspace.length > 0 && config.confirmWritesOutsideWorkspace) {
+		return makeDecision(
+			"confirm",
+			`Confirm ${commandName} write outside workspace`,
+			`${commandName} may modify a path outside the configured workspace roots.`,
+			outsideWorkspace.flatMap((item) => [`Argument: ${item.token}`, ...item.details]),
+		);
+	}
+
+	return null;
+}
+
 function extractPrimaryCommand(tokens: string[]): {
 	command: string | null;
 	args: string[];
@@ -542,36 +693,62 @@ function classifyBash(command: string, cwd: string, config: ResolvedConfig): Dec
 			"Confirm sudo command",
 			"sudo requires explicit human review.",
 			[`Nested command: ${primary.command} ${primary.args.join(" ")}`.trim()],
+			nestedDecision.action === "confirm" ? nestedDecision.suggest : undefined,
 		);
 	}
 
+	if (SHELL_WRAPPERS.has(cmd)) {
+		const nestedCode = extractShellCodeArg(primary.args);
+		if (nestedCode) {
+			return classifyBash(nestedCode, cwd, config);
+		}
+	}
+
 	if (cmd === "rm") return classifyRm(primary.args, cwd, config);
 	if (cmd === "find") return classifyFind(primary.args, cwd, config);
 	if (cmd === "git") return classifyGit(primary.args);
 	if (cmd === "systemctl") return classifySystemCtl(primary.args);
-	if (["dnf", "yum", "apt", "apt-get", "zypper", "pacman"].includes(cmd)) {
+	if (PACKAGE_MANAGER_COMMANDS.has(cmd)) {
 		return classifyPackageManager(cmd, primary.args);
 	}
 	if (["chmod", "chown"].includes(cmd)) {
 		return classifyChmodLike(cmd, primary.args);
 	}
-	if (["ssh", "scp", "sftp", "rsync", "mosh"].includes(cmd)) {
+	if (REMOTE_COMMANDS.has(cmd)) {
 		return makeDecision("confirm", `Confirm ${cmd}`, `${cmd} can affect remote systems or transfer data.`);
 	}
-	if (["docker", "podman", "kubectl", "helm", "mount", "umount", "dd"].includes(cmd)) {
-		return makeDecision("confirm", `Confirm ${cmd}`, `${cmd} can affect containers, clusters, devices, or mounts.`);
+	if (NETWORK_COMMANDS.has(cmd)) {
+		return makeDecision("confirm", `Confirm ${cmd}`, `${cmd} can reach external systems or open raw network channels.`);
+	}
+	if (["env", "printenv"].includes(cmd)) {
+		return makeDecision("confirm", `Confirm ${cmd}`, `${cmd} can reveal credentials or sensitive environment data.`);
+	}
+	if (PLATFORM_CONTROL_COMMANDS.has(cmd)) {
+		return makeDecision("confirm", `Confirm ${cmd}`, `${cmd} can affect containers, clusters, scheduled tasks, devices, or mounts.`);
+	}
+	if (cmd === "sed" && primary.args.some((token) => token === "-i" || token.startsWith("-i"))) {
+		const pathDecision = classifyPathAccessFromBash("write", cmd, extractCandidatePathTokens(cmd, primary.args, command), cwd, config);
+		if (pathDecision) return pathDecision;
+		return makeDecision("confirm", "Confirm sed -i", "In-place sed edit requested.");
+	}
+	if (cmd === "perl" && primary.args.some((token) => token === "-pi" || token.startsWith("-pi"))) {
+		const pathDecision = classifyPathAccessFromBash("write", cmd, extractCandidatePathTokens(cmd, primary.args, command), cwd, config);
+		if (pathDecision) return pathDecision;
+		return makeDecision("confirm", "Confirm perl -pi", "In-place perl edit requested.");
+	}
+	if (PATH_AWARE_WRITE_COMMANDS.has(cmd)) {
+		const pathDecision = classifyPathAccessFromBash("write", cmd, extractCandidatePathTokens(cmd, primary.args, command), cwd, config);
+		if (pathDecision) return pathDecision;
+	}
+	if (PATH_AWARE_READ_COMMANDS.has(cmd)) {
+		const pathDecision = classifyPathAccessFromBash("read", cmd, extractCandidatePathTokens(cmd, primary.args, command), cwd, config);
+		if (pathDecision) return pathDecision;
 	}
 	return makeDecision("allow", "Allow bash", "No risky pattern matched by the default policy.");
 }
 
 function classifyPathTool(tool: ToolName, rawPath: string, cwd: string, config: ResolvedConfig): Decision {
-	const absPath = canonicalizePath(isAbsolute(expandHome(rawPath)) ? expandHome(rawPath) : resolve(cwd, rawPath));
-	const inWorkspace = config.workspaceRoots.some((root) => isWithinRoot(absPath, root));
-	const sensitive = isSensitivePath(absPath, cwd, config);
-	const details = [
-		`Resolved path: ${summarizePath(absPath, cwd)}`,
-		`Workspace roots: ${summarizeRoots(config, cwd).join(", ")}`,
-	];
+	const { inWorkspace, sensitive, details } = extractPathAssessment(tool, rawPath, cwd, config);
 
 	if (tool === "read") {
 		if (sensitive && config.confirmSensitiveReads) {
@@ -628,7 +805,8 @@ export default function policyGate(pi: ExtensionAPI) {
 				`- Workspace roots currently protected: ${roots}.\n` +
 				"- For recursive or forceful deletes, use an explicit absolute path, never wildcards or broad targets.\n" +
 				"- If a command is blocked or requires refinement, propose a safer reformulation instead of trying to bypass the gate.\n" +
-				"- Treat sudo, ssh, rsync, scp, service changes, and destructive git operations as review-worthy actions.\n",
+				"- Treat sudo, ssh, rsync, scp, service changes, destructive git operations, raw network clients, and environment dumps as review-worthy actions.\n" +
+				"- Be especially careful with AGENTS.md, CLAUDE.md, .env files, shell dotfiles, SSH keys, and local policy files.\n",
 		};
 	});
 
@@ -644,6 +822,8 @@ export default function policyGate(pi: ExtensionAPI) {
 				`Sensitive writes require confirm: ${activeConfig.confirmSensitiveWrites}`,
 				`Writes outside workspace require confirm: ${activeConfig.confirmWritesOutsideWorkspace}`,
 				`Recursive delete requires absolute path: ${activeConfig.requireAbsolutePathForRecursiveDelete}`,
+				"Built-in default policy:",
+				...DEFAULT_POLICY_FEATURES.map((feature) => `- ${feature}`),
 			].join("\n");
 			if (ctx.hasUI) ctx.ui.notify(summary, "info");
 			else console.log(summary);

package-lock.json

@@ -1,12 +1,12 @@
 {
   "name": "@enne2/pi-policy-gate",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
   "lockfileVersion": 3,
   "requires": true,
   "packages": {
     "": {
       "name": "@enne2/pi-policy-gate",
-      "version": "0.1.0",
+      "version": "0.2.0",
       "license": "MIT",
       "dependencies": {
         "minimatch": "^10.1.1"

package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@enne2/pi-policy-gate",
-  "version": "0.1.0",
+  "version": "0.2.0",
   "description": "Policy gate extension for pi that classifies risky tool calls into allow, confirm, deny, or require-refinement.",
   "type": "module",
   "keywords": [